CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH ON THE BRITISH LEFT AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter reviews the existing research on the British Left and European integration. It begins with some general criticisms of the literature as a whole, before criticising the three main approaches to date (institutional, discursive and political economy) whilst highlighting the major themes that emerged from them. Discussing the limitations of this work prepares the way for Chapter 3, which sets out how this thesis attempts to advance the state of knowledge on this subject.

2.1 GENERAL CRITICISMS

A number of general criticisms can be levelled at the existing literature. The first criticism is that academic interest in this subject was slow to develop. European integration has been an important issue for the left throughout the post-war period. However, the subject of the British Left and European integration, which is a sub-field of EU studies, itself a sub-discipline of political science and international relations, has only recently received academic attention. One tenth of the literature was produced in the 1970s, when Britain's accession and referendum on continued EU membership brought the subject to the fore. One fifth emerged in the 1980s, the decade which saw the launch of the Single Market, whilst two-thirds dates from the 1990s, when the process of European integration accelerated. The trend suggests a correlation between the degree of Britain's integration with Europe, the issue's salience, and the volume of literature produced.

The second criticism is the universal failure of scholars to define the dependent and independent variables within their work. The lack of conceptual clarity makes it difficult to identify the key ideas and arguments, which in turn makes it difficult to discern, and critically engage with, the literature as a whole.

The third criticism is the parochial nature of the literature, with scholars commonly failing to engage with each other's work. It applies to the work on the British Left and European integration, which explains the dearth of live debates within the literature. It also applies to the wider literature, in that scholars neglected to locate their work within, and draw upon, the institutional, discursive or political economy literature.

The fourth criticism is the ahistorical nature of much of the literature. By concentrating on particular time frames rather than the post-war period as a whole, the literature has missed the opportunity to identify the common and/or recurrent themes which may aid understanding and explanation.

The fifth criticism is the atheoretical status of most of the literature. Stoker (1995) argued that theory is essential in that it enables us to order our observations and understanding of social phenomena. However, with the exception of Robins (1979) and Cocks (1980), no theories concerning the British Left and European integration have been advanced or tested.

The sixth criticism is the general neglect of the wealth of documentary evidence that exists in the archives of political parties, trade unions and the Public Records Office (PRO). As a result, much of the literature tends to be descriptive and polemical rather than empirical and scholarly.

The seventh criticism is the failure to investigate the role of 'organic intellectuals', understood in the Gramscian sense. Michael Barratt Brown, Tony Benn, Ken Coates, Stuart Holland, Austin Mitchell and others, who are academics and/or politicians, seem to exercise considerable influence on the British Left. However, their role in the policy-making process is generally not explored within the literature.

The eighth criticism is the neglect of historical materialism, the notion that cultural, political, and social phenomena are determined by the mode of production of commodities (Abercrombie et al. 2000). Paradoxically, although the literature is concerned with the response of the British Left to European integration, and although Marxism has exerted a significant impact on sections of the British Left, most scholars do not bring a historical materialist perspective to the subject. Carchedi and Carchedi (1999, p.120) argued that class analysis had been 'expelled, for obvious ideological reasons, from official and academic discourse' on European integration. Smith (2002, p.265) suggested that these reasons include 'the closeness of the discipline to US foreign policy theory and practice' and that 'Marxist theorising was associated by many with a discredited political project.'

The final criticism is that, with the exception of the aforementioned intellectuals, few scholars make explicit their personal bias. Most publications on the subject, particularly textbooks, implicitly assume that 'ever-closer union' is either desirable or inevitable. This, in part, may result from the direct funding of EU studies and politics departments by the European Commission. Since 1990, for example, it has contributed to the funding of 2,319 new teaching projects across the EU; this represents a significant academic investment by an obviously biased source.

2.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

The institutional approach to analysis of the British Left and European integration focused on the European policies of specific left-wing institutions: the Labour Party, the TUC, the Green Party, Plaid Cymru, the SNP and the SDP. The institutional approach also assessed the influence of EU domestic and foreign policy, plus the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the US, on the British Left's debate about European integration.

The European Policy of the Labour Party

The literature on the Labour Party's European policy was divided into particular leadership periods. Focusing on the *Clement Attlee* period (1945-1955), Gupta (1983), Greenwood (1984, 1993), Warner (1984), Young (1984), Adamthwaite (1985), Kent (1989) and Curtis (1995) described how Labour's European policy paralleled that of the British State, as the latter attempted to fashion an independent foreign policy. Rose (1966), Grantham (1981), Schneer (1984), Young (1984), Carew (1987), Reynolds (1991) and Dejak (1993) discussed Labour's policy shift in 1948, when it abandoned the third force concept, and the consequent division between supporters of a socialist third force and the Atlanticists. Mayne and Pinder (1990) and Dejak (1993) detailed the Federal Union's attempts to promote a European federation within the Labour Party during the 1940s.

Concentrating on the *Hugh Gaitskell* period (1955-1963), Anderson and Hall (1961), Barratt Brown and Hughes (1961) and Jay (1968, 1993) presented the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the North Atlantic free trade area as alternatives to EU entry. They highlighted the high economic costs of entry, estimated at £600-1000 million per year.

Discussing the *Harold Wilson* period (1963-1976), Kitzinger (1973), Lazer (1976), Bilski (1977), Minkin (1980), Daly (1993), Marquand et al. (1993a, 1993b), and Butler and Kitzinger (1996) focused on the growing conflict within the Labour Party about entry. Division existed between an increasingly sceptical membership and a Labour leadership intent on entry, and between anti- and pro-EU pressure groups. These tended to split along left-right lines, with the left generally opposed to the EU.

Robins (1979) advanced an alternative, empirical approach to the classical elitist and pluralist models of power distribution within political parties. Robins argued that the 1960s 'great debate' about the EU concerned only a minority of Labour MPs. Consequently, the party leadership dominated the policy-making process, as the elitist model would suggest. However, from 1971 onwards, the issue of entry was increasingly a matter of concern for Labour MPs and party members; policy-making was thus characterised by higher levels of participation, as suggested by the pluralist model.

Foot (1968), Kitzinger (1968), Donoughue (1993), Wrigley (1993) and Daddow (2003) traced Wilson's 1967 shift in favour of entry, suggesting several reasons to explain the change; Wilson apparently came to see the EU as a solution to Britain's economic and political crises, and an alternative to the Anglo-US 'special relationship'. Hollingsworth (1986), Broad and Geiger (1996), Butler and Kitzinger (1996), Smith (1999) and Forster (2002b) focused on Labour's handling of the issue during the 1975 Referendum.

Evaluating the *James Callaghan* (1976-1979) and *Michael Foot* (1979-1983) periods, Featherstone (1981) conducted a survey of Labour MPs elected before 1979 and found that a majority were opposed to economic, monetary and political union, regardless of their position on the EU. Daly (1993) discussed the Campaign for Labour Victory, launched in 1977 to unify the right against the ascendant left and to reverse Labour members' growing support for withdrawal, whilst Forster (2002b) argued that scepticism towards the EU was more pronounced when parties were in opposition.

The major theme during the *Neil Kinnock* (1983-1992) and *John Smith* (1992-1994) periods was Labour's Europeanisation. Grahl and Teague (1988), Shaw (1993), Gardiner (1996), Daniels (1998) and Ramsay (1998) identified four economic motivations: the alleged failure of the 1981-1982 'Mitterand experiment', the perceived redundancy of Keynesianism, Labour's conversion to Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) entry, and its capitulation to the then pro-EU City of London. Grahl and Teague (1988), Shaw (1993), Geddes (1994), Gardiner (1996), Daniels (1998), Heffernan (2000) and Broad (2001) identified three electoral reasons: the threat posed by the pro-EU Liberal-SDP Alliance, the impact of successive general election defeats and Labour's success in European elections. Grahl and Teague (1988), Tindale (1992), Gardiner (1996), Daniels (1998), Heffernan (2000), Broad (2001) and Forster (2002a) identified a range of political factors: the retreat from radical economic policies and the defeat of the anti-EU Bennites, plus increased contact between Labour MPs, party officials, trade unionists and their continental counterparts. They also included the shift of the EU in a social democratic direction, the Europeanisation of the trade union movement, the pivotal role played by Kinnock, the impact of the new intake of pro-EU MPs and the portrayal of the anti-EU left as 'extremists'.

In terms of the mechanics of the policy change, Hughes and Wintour (1990), Shaw (1994), Wickham-Jones (1996) and Ramsay (1998) highlighted the importance of the 1987-1991 Policy Review to Labour's Europeanisation. However, a number of scholars challenged the Europeanisation thesis; Holmes (1991), Minkin (1992) and Geddes (1994) argued that Labour's apparent conversion was rooted in pragmatism rather than idealism.

The *Tony Blair* period (from 1994) witnessed the continuing Europeanisation of the Labour Party and New Labour's promotion of the Third Way. Seyd and Whiteley (1992, 2002), Baker et al. (1996, 1999, 2002), Whitley and Seyd (1998), Cowley (2000) and Aspinwall (2003) conducted a number of surveys of Labour members and parliamentarians to assess their views on the EU. Their findings tend to confirm the Europeanisation thesis. Mandelson and Liddle (1996) and Gould (1998), key architects of the New Labour project, stressed the importance of constructive engagement with the EU. Applebaum (1997), Hughes and Smith (1998) and MacShane (1998) claimed that New Labour's European policy marked a break with the past, whilst Holden (2002) argued that Europeanisation was presented as evidence of a commitment to the 'modernisation' process. Reviewing New Labour's stance on euro entry, Aaronovitch and Grahl (1997), Gamble and Kelly (2000), Hix (2002) and Carter (2003) concluded that it represented a crucial test for its European policy.

Citing the historical failure of social democracy and the reality of globalisation, Blair and Schröder (1999) urged the European left to 'modernise', embrace the Third Way, and develop a new supply-side economic agenda. However, Coates and Barratt Brown (1999) and Callinicos (2001a) dismissed the Third Way as New Labour-style neo-liberalism.

Gillespie and Paterson (1993), Bell and Shaw (1994), Kitchelt (1994), George (1998), Knutson (1998), Orlov (1999), Sassoon (1999), Vandenbroucke (1999), Ray (1999) and Marks and Wilson (2000) argued that the post-war period witnessed the convergence of Europe's social democratic parties, including the Labour Party, a process which included their Europeanisation. Bogdanor (1977, 1981) and Thompson (1981), however, emphasised the diversity of the European lefts with reference to their divergent histories and trajectories. Newman (1983), Featherstone (1986), Padgett and Paterson (1991), Haahr (1992, 1993), Griffiths (1993) Tiersky (1995), Bohrer and Tan (2000), and Hooghe et al. (2002) compared the European policies of the British and European lefts. They identified three similarities: greater scepticism towards the EU from the left within social democratic parties, outright hostility from the far left, and a process of Europeanisation dating from the 1980s.

The European Policies of the Trade Union Movement

Most of the literature focused on the European policy of the TUC. Dorfman (1977) discussed the divisions within the TUC about European integration, whilst Teague (1989b) traced the four key periods of its European policy: pre-1972 ('wait and see'), 1972-1975 (opposition), 1976-1979 (re-engagement), and post-1980 (opposition). Teague concluded that, as a result of its commitment to national Keynesianism, the TUC's Europeanisation was limited; the TUC continue to direct most of its campaigning and lobbying at the national level.

Macshane (1991), Rosamond (1993a, 1993b) and Strange (1995, 2002) challenged Teague's work, insisting that he had underestimated the Europeanisation process. They identified a number of reasons to explain why the TUC shifted its policy in the 1980s. These included the 1975 Referendum result, the end of the Cold War, social democratic developments within the EU, the lobbying impact of the European Trades Union Confederation (ETUC), the weakening of trade unions, and their exclusion from power by the Conservatives. Strange also argued that TUC economic policy had fundamentally changed since the early 1980s, away from national Keynesianism towards an EU strategy.

In terms of the wider trade union movement, Minkin (1980) argued that right-wing unions were generally pro-EU, whilst left-wing unions were usually opposed. Sterling (1991) parodied the Social Chapter as the new 'Holy Grail' for unions, arguing that it was minimalist in its design, scope and implementation. Rosamond (1993a, 1993b) claimed that the TUC was able to manipulate the European policy agenda of constituent unions through its information and research capacity. Wendon (1994) described how several unions pursued a twin-track approach of lobbying EU institutions, whilst building links with continental unions in the 1980s to progress workers' interests *vis-à-vis* MNCs. However, like Teague, he concluded that unions remained predominantly national in their orientation. O'Brien (2000), Taylor and Mathers (2002) and Bieler (2003), however, pointed to the development of a European labour movement.

The European Policy of the Green Party

Green Party members Christie (1999), Lucas (1999), Hines (2000) and Lucas and Woodin (2000) argued that the common themes linking EU policies was their anti-democratic, centralising, deflationary, imperialist and monetarist nature. Furthermore, these policies accelerated the process of globalisation. The alternative proposed by Christie was a programme of 'eco-Keynesianism', whilst Hines, Lucas and Woodin advocated a strategy of localisation. Such a strategy would include the re-introduction of localised currencies, capital controls, tariffs, and the reform of aid and trade regimes. Lang and Hines (1993) characterised the EU as one of the three protectionist blocs controlling the global economy.

Warren (1993), Pollack (1996) and Haigh (1998) focused on the emergent EU environmental policy, concluding that, unlike national governments, the EU possessed a greater capacity to revolutionise Europe's economies by fully integrating environmental concerns in its policies. Richardson and Rootes (1995) and Dietz (2000) traced the evolution of Green parties across Europe and their differing policy positions on the EU, concluding that Green parties were generally more sceptical than most other parties.

The European Policies of the Nationalist Parties

Lynch (1996, 2002), Mitchell (1998) and McAllister (2001) argued that Plaid Cymru and the SNP were enthusiastic about European integration in the early post-war period. They shifted to a sceptical policy position in the 1960s due to the lack of Scottish and Welsh representation during the entry negotiations. Both parties divided along left-right lines, with the left generally opposed to entry. By 1970, Plaid and the SNP were opposed to entry on the basis that it would worsen the democratic deficit of Scotland and Wales. As an alternative, they advocated a European confederation and supported EFTA membership. During the 1975 Referendum both parties campaigned for a No vote, hoping to exploit any division with England to their benefit. Both parties underwent a process of Europeanisation in the 1980s, resulting in their common support for an 'independence in Europe' policy.

Nairn (1981, 2000) critically surveyed the history and development of Scottish Nationalism, plus the SNP's policy of independence in Europe, questioning whether the latter merely replaced subordination by Britain with subordination by the EU. Furthermore, in a direct challenge to the alleged pro-EU consensus among Nationalists, the comparative survey conducted by Baker et al. (2002) found that, in terms of the balance of opinion within the main political parties, Nationalist parties were the most divided on the issue of the EU.

The European Policy of the Social Democratic Party

Bradley (1981), Marquand et al. (1993a) and Younger et al. (1993) believed that Labour's endorsement of withdrawal in 1980 was one of the principal factors precipitating the formation of the SDP. Crewe and King (1995) challenged this view, arguing that, although the EU was an important issue, it was not the primary one. The fact that many on the Labour Right who supported the EU did not defect to the SDP was cited as evidence. Easton (1996) criticised the thesis of Crewe and King that the SDP project was a failure. Citing links between the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the SDP, Easton alleged that the strategic policy of the US was to support the SDP in order to damage the Labour Party.

The Common Agricultural Policy

Burkitt and Baimbridge (1990) argued that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) resulted in higher than world market prices for consumers, reversed the trend towards self-sufficiency, and transformed the nature of agricultural imports to the detriment of developing countries. Thomas (1996) defended the CAP, yet conceded that the agricultural sector it was designed to support no longer existed.

The Common Fisheries Policy

Mitchell (1996) criticised the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) as an expensive, bureaucratic failure that was damaging to the fishing industry. He claimed that the Six adopted the policy before the entry negotiations began, that membership was conditional on its acceptance, and that the Conservatives abrogated their responsibility to safeguard fishing interests as the price for entry.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy

For Galtung (1973), the EU was an emergent superpower, founded upon both an economic and military mode of development. Nairn (1976) disputed Galtung's thesis, concluding that there was no prospect of a *Pax Bruxellana.* However, Rai (1993) presciently warned that the aim of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was to enable the EU to operate militarily outside Europe and independently of the US. He also argued that it would enable joint action by individual member states, which Britain and France, with long records of foreign military interventions and the largest military forces within the EU, could exploit.

Economic and Monetary Union

Burkitt and Baimbridge (1994), Elgie (1998), Baimbridge et al. (1999) and Abbott (2000) criticised the policy of central bank independence, a key requirement of EMU, advancing three main objections to such a policy: the lack of accountability and democracy, its institutionalisation of monetarism, and the consequent propensity to worsen recessions.

Baimbridge (1992), Burkitt and Baimbridge (1992), Burkitt et al. (1993), Baimbridge and Burkitt (1994), Eatwell (1994), Gould (1994), Kelly (1994), Kinnock (1994), Bonefeld and Burnham (1996), Mills (1998) and Michie (2000) argued that the ERM was deflationary and monetarist. ERM membership served the interests of the financial sector rather than the real economy, producing higher interest rates, lower economic growth, falling investment, higher unemployment and declining competitiveness. The exception to this critical literature was Fishman (1980), who argued that the left's support for devaluation, which ERM entry would preclude, was misplaced. The ERM provided Britain with the opportunity to manage sterling as a European rather than an international reserve currency.

Burkitt and Baimbridge (1993) and Burkitt (2000) argued that the Maastricht convergence criteria (MCC) were incompatible with defending the welfare state because compliance required tax increases or (more politically expedient) spending cuts. Palmer (1998) favoured the former, claiming that the left had no alternative but to pursue a counter-inflationary strategy. Martin and Lister (1998) demonstrated how the MCC encouraged the expansion of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), as successive governments sought to reduce the level of public debt.

Baimbridge and Burkitt (1993) and Baimbridge et al. (1995) linked the Maastricht Treaty with the rise of racism across the EU. Citing the results of successive European elections, they argued that the MCC resulted in low economic growth and high unemployment which, when exploited by the far right, exacerbated racism.

Bishop (1993), Palmer (1993, 1997), Donnelly (1996) and Corry (1997) set out the left case for euro entry. They anticipated that the euro would increase employment through lower interest rates, lower inflation, increased trade, greater efficiency and reduced transaction costs. They claimed that it would help to curb currency speculation, that devaluation, the preferred option of many on the left, was socially regressive and ineffective in the longer term, and that the MCC would not preclude Euro-Keynesianism policies. Baimbridge et al. (2000) reviewed the case for entry after several years of debate. More recent arguments included the euro's potential as a global reserve currency, Britain's vulnerability to monetary policy decisions it had no influence over, the loss of sovereignty as a result of globalisation, and the need to defend the 'European social model' by joining EMU.

The left case against the euro was put forward by Baimbridge (1995), Burkitt (1997, 1998), Elliott (1997), Michie (1997) and Bonefeld (1998, 2001). They argued that the eurozone did not constitute an optimal currency area because of the lack of labour mobility and the inadequacy of fiscal transfers within the EU. They also highlighted the high operational costs of the euro, the burdens associated with uniform fiscal and monetary policies, its capacity to generate unemployment, and the problem of divergent shocks within the eurozone. Baimbridge et al. (2000) reviewed the case against the euro after several years of debate. More recent arguments included the damaging effects of the MCC/SGP, the weakness of the euro *vis-à-vis* the dollar, plus the substantial transition costs. Entry would result in the further 'rolling back' of the state and would exacerbate Britain's 'boom and bust' cycle as a result of both cyclical and structural differences with the eurozone. Furthermore, the European Central Bank (ECB) was not accountable or democratic.

A body of work has recently emerged on the prospects of a future euro referendum. Worcester (2000, 2002) highlighted the lessons of the 1975 Referendum. Scholefield (2000) identified several pieces of legislation that made New Labour's policy of euro entry difficult to achieve. Leonard and Arbuthnott (2001) presented New Labour with a list of what it needed to do to win. Mortimore and Atkinson (2003) argued that the 45 per cent of the population who were 'undecided' could be persuaded to vote Yes, whilst Mullen and Burkitt (2003) argued that ten years of polls showing a consistent majority against entry constituted an effective obstacle to New Labour's euro policy. They also demonstrated that its policy was one of 'prepare and persuade' rather than 'wait and see', as evidenced by several institutional and legislative changes and two pro-euro propaganda campaigns. However, using Korpi's (1983) notion of power resources, they concluded that the No and Yes campaigns were more evenly balanced when compared to the 1975 Referendum.

Employment and Industrial Policy

Denton (1967), Coates and Barratt Brown (1993), Cripps and Ward (1993, 1994), Holland (1993), Grieve Smith (1994), Coates and Holland (1995), Hendrick (1996) and Coates et al. (1998) discussed the development of a common employment and industrial policy. They concluded that such a policy was having a gradual impact on industrial relations in Britain.

Justice and Home Affairs

Bunyan (1993) believed that the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy represented a qualitative shift for the EU, one that could not simply be attributed to its supranational nature. Instead, it was part of the ongoing construction of a centralised European state. Bunyan further argued that the basic features of liberal democracy (the separation of powers, democratic accountability, due process of law, and legitimacy) were largely absent in the case of the integrating EU.

Regional Policy

O'Neill (1994), McCarthy (1996), and Goldsmith and Klausen (1997) discussed EU regional policy, specifically the Europe of the Regions agenda. They concluded that it was transforming local and regional government into an increasingly powerful player *vis-à-vis* the state.

The Single Market

Kinnock (1986), Camiller (1989), Gould (1989) and Grahl and Teague (1989, 1990) focused on the economic aspects of the Single Market. They argued that it would strengthen MNCs *vis-à-vis* the state and possibly lead to a centralised European government with no democratic legitimacy. Collier (1994) and Tomaney (1994) claimed that the Single Market would exacerbate rather than reduce regional divergences, whilst Burkitt et al. (1996) dismissed the claims made by the Cecchini Report, that the Single Market would lead to increased economic growth and more jobs. Gordon (1989), Mayo (1989) and Compston (1998) highlighted the political aspects, particularly the effects of the Single Market on immigration and trade policies, and its impact of policy concertation among member states.

The Social Chapter

Teague (1989, 1991, 1994), Grahl and Teague (1990), Silvia (1991), Streeck (1994), Weston and Lucio (1997) and Ackers and Payne (1998) discussed the Social Chapter. They argued that it possessed the potential to promote employment and welfare policy convergence across the EU in the long-term, even though member states were paradoxically pursuing both a 'European social model' and monetarist macroeconomic policies.

Soviet Foreign Policy

Previously classified state documents unearthed by Pechatnov (1995) reveal that the primary strategic goal of the Soviet Union was to prevent the formation of a rival power in Europe. Consequently, it was not averse to an alliance of democratic European states, even one with a military force at its disposal, and it had no objection to a federal Europe (Mark, 2001). Therefore, during the early post-war period, the Soviet Union was supportive of European integration. Indeed, the early plans for the European Recovery Programme (ERP), drawn up by US state planners, included the Soviet bloc. However, the policy was reversed at the 1947 Paris Conference when the Soviet Union declared its unwillingness to relinquish control over its economy and resources. Charging that the ERP would violate national sovereignty and enable the US to influence the internal affairs of European nations, the Soviet Union declared its opposition to it. Van Dijk (1996) reported that, in 1952, the Soviet Union offered to support a united, independent and neutral Germany, conditional upon Germany remaining outside the European Defence Community (EDC) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Although Britain supported the proposal, the US effectively subverted it, so that the Cold War division of Europe persisted.

United States Foreign Policy

Overt US support for European integration took the form of the ERP and the consistent diplomatic support of successive US administrations, documented by Lundestad (1998). The conventional perspective on the ERP, advanced by many US scholars, holds that the US saved post-war Western Europe from economic collapse and Soviet domination. The revisionist perspective elaborated by Maier (1977), Jackson (1979), Rappaport (1981), Milward (1984), Carew (1984, 1987), Palmer (1987), Chomsky (1992) and Vickers (2000) challenged this view. Maier claimed that the ERP aimed to transform the class conflict about European production and consumption into an apolitical concern for output and productivity. In so doing, Milward suggested, the US hoped to reconstruct Western Europe politically. Maier, Carew and Vickers described how the ERP succeeded in dividing Europe's labour movements. Jackson, Palmer and Rappaport maintained that the ERP was motivated by geopolitical factors, namely the containment of the Soviet Union. Chomsky, on the other hand, argued that it was driven by economic self-interest. The ERP opened Western European economies to US corporations, whilst providing them with a huge subsidy worth billions of dollars. Hogan (1982, 1987) and Lundestad (1998) attempted to bridge the conventional and revisionist accounts. They concluded that the US supported European integration, so that it could construct a liberal multilateral economic order, export its economic model, and contain Germany and the Soviet Union.

The US also supported European integration by covert means. Hirsch and Fletcher (1977), Agee and Wolf (1978), Broad and Geiger (1996), Lashmar and Oliver (1998), Ramsay (1998), Dorril (2000), Shore (2000), Aldrich (2001) and Wilford (2003) discussed the US financial and political support for the European Movement and other organisations that supported European federalism. Hirsch and Fletcher, Coleman (1989), Stoner Saunders (2000) and Blum (2003) revealed how the US supported pro-EU figures on the right of the labour and trade union movement. Eringer (1980), Thompson (1980), Gill (1991) Peters (1996), Black (2001), van der Pijl (1998), Ramsay (2002) and Gill (2003) detailed the role of the annual Bilderberg Conference, attended by elites from the EU and the US, which sought to accelerate European economic and political integration. Barnes (1981, 1982), *Open Eye* (1991), Blum (2003) and Ganser (2005) focused on the numerous CIA and NATO operations against the European left.

2.3 THE DISCURSIVE APPROACH

Following the development of the cultural/discursive approach in the social sciences during the 1970s, a number of studies focused on the discourse of the British Left on European integration. However, a lag existed between the establishment of discourse analysis as a methodology and its application to this subject.

The Contamination Thesis

The 'contamination' thesis expounded by Ramsay (1997) described the fear of association with an idea from, or people belonging to, the ideological opposition. In this case, it referred to the fear of the anti-EU left of being associated with, and thus 'contaminated' by, right-wing Euroscepticism. An early example of this phenomenon is Nairn's (1971, 1973) critique of left-wing nationalism. Nairn believed that, in opposing continued membership, the left was abandoning class for nation just when the ruling class, in search of a larger market, was abandoning the nation for the EU. He insisted that nationalism was a device to maintain Labour unity, that ruling class liberal internationalism was 'phoney internationalism', and that, in making a nationalist case against the EU, the left was allying itself with the right. Similarly, Morrell (1988) charged that left-wing nationalism was insular and infused with imperial illusions, whilst Ford et al. (1996) dismissed the 'British exceptionalism' propounded by the anti-EU left.

Propaganda Campaigns

According to Benn (1989), Ramsay (2000), Young (2000), Shore (2000), and Booker and North (2003), the political elite resorted to deception, propaganda and subterfuge to integrate Britain within the EU. Mayne and Pinder (1990) focused on the early propaganda campaigns by the Federal Union. Kisch (1964) and Jenkins (1998) discussed the first national propaganda campaign in 1962-1963, to bolster public support for entry. Kitzinger (1973), Evans (1975), Jenkins (1998), Lashmar and Oliver (1998), the British Management Data Foundation (2000), Aldrich (2001) and Wistrich (2001) detailed the second national campaign in 1971-1972, to prepare the public for accession. Broad and Geiger (1996), Butler and Kitzinger (1996), Hollingsworth (1986), McAlpine (1997) and Wistrich (2001) focused on the third national campaign, preceding and during the 1975 Referendum. Mullen and Burkitt (2003, 2005), in discussing the preparations to ensure a Yes vote in a future euro referendum, advanced several reasons why pro-EU forces had resorted to propaganda rather than education. These included the need to obfuscate the political nature of the EU project, its economic and political costs, and its domination by business interests.

2.4 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH

The political economy approach was resurrected within political science, and the wider social sciences, in the 1970s. However, once again, a lag existed before it was applied to this subject.

The Attlee Government

Warner (1984), Young (1984), Newton (1985a, 1985b) and Kent (1989) debated the rationale for Labour's European policy shift in 1948, from support to opposition to European integration that involved Britain. They agreed that it was based on a fear that integration would threaten the sterling balances, and hence Labour's economic and social programme.

The Alternative Economic Strategy and Alternative European Strategy

Proponents of the Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), such as Barratt Brown (1974), the Cambridge Political Economy Group (1974), Barratt Brown and Coates (1975), Eaton (1975), Holland (1975, 1980), Aaronovitch (1981) and Glyn (1985) were clear about the implications of continued EU membership. Capital and import controls, essential elements of the AES, were contrary to the 1957 Treaty of Rome; the EU was therefore perceived as a barrier to socialist advancement. Furthermore, Callaghan (2000) asserted that the AES was a realistic programme in the mid-1970s, given the negligible economic costs of withdrawal.

Left-wing support for the AES and Labour's withdrawal policy was challenged in the early 1980s, when the CSE London Working Group (1979, 1980), Holland (1983, 1985), Palmer (1983) and Teague (1985) recommended the internationalisation of the AES. However, advocates of the Alternative European Strategy (AEUS) were ambiguous about the respective roles of the EU and nation-state in advancing socialism. Later work on the AEUS, by Morrell (1985), Aaronovitch (1986), Coates (1986, 1998a, 1998b), Barratt Brown (1991), Coates and Barratt Brown (1993), Cripps and Ward (1993), Holland (1993), and Coates and Holland (1995) was less ambivalent about the role of the EU *vis-à-vis* the state. These authors believed that the combined power of financial capital and MNCs effectively precluded a national strategy, thus necessitating an alternative Euro-Keynesian approach.

Callaghan (2000) argued that high unemployment, increasing trade with the EU, the perceived failure of the 'Mitterand experiment', the fragmentation of the left and the 'modernisation' process, all served to undermine support for the AES. He further argued that key supporters of the AES shifted in favour of EU rather than national action, that Delors helped to transform the European policies of the labour movement, and that Kinnock aspired to move Britain, via EU law, towards the 'European social model' of capitalism.

The Costs of European Union Membership

Although no government has conducted a cost-benefit analysis of EU membership, Barratt Brown (1974), Burkitt (1974), Holland (1975), Benn (1980), Burkitt et al. (1992, 1996, 1997) and Elliott and Atkinson (1998) attempted to assess the economic costs. Two studies tried to put a figure to these costs. The first, by Jay (1968), estimated the probable economic cost at between £600 and £1,000 million per year. The second, by Podmore and Katz (1998), estimated the combined cost of EU Budget contributions, the ERM and the MCC, plus the cumulative trade deficit between 1973 and 1997, at £255 billion. Burkitt (1975), Benn (1980, 1982), Burkitt et al. (1992) and Benn and Hood (1993) reviewed the political costs of membership, arguing that the EU undermined democracy, national sovereignty and Britain's capacity for self-government. Hix (1998), however, advocated EU reform to remedy its democratic deficit. Holland (1975), Newman (1983) and Moss (1998) highlighted the opportunity costs, in the sense that the EU constitutes a barrier to the implementation of the left's economic and social programme.

The Globalisation Thesis

A number of scholars located the European policy issue within the globalisation debate, assessing the impact of capitalism's changing structure on the left's economic and political strategy and on Europe's welfare states. Morrell (1988), Barratt Brown (1991) and Radice (1984, 1996, 1999a) argued that globalisation rendered obsolete the national strategies of the British Left. Helleiner (1995), Kitson and Michie (1998), Weiss (1998, 2003) and Hirst and Thompson (1999), on the other hand, argued that the globalisation thesis exaggerated the weakness of the state.

Mandel (1970), Palmer (1987, 1988), Livingstone (1989) and Hutton (1995, 2002) debated whether the EU threatened or safeguarded the 'European social model'. Bislev (1992), Geyer (1993, 1998), Burkitt et al. (1995), Weiss (1998), Hans-Werner (2000), Scarborough (2000), Kleinman (2002), Schettkat (2003) and Burkitt (2004) questioned whether such a model existed, highlighted the diversity of welfare systems across the EU.

Marxist and Neo-Gramscian Perspectives

Although historically the issue of European integration has not figured highly in the Marxist corpus, there have been a number of significant contributions. Mandel (1967), Glyn and Sutcliffe (1971), Sassoon (1979), Cocks (1980), Holloway and Piccioto (1980), and Carchedi and Carchedi (1999) applied a class analysis to the subject, treating European integration as a capitalist phenomenon.

George (1991) applied Wallerstein's (1979) World Systems Theory to European Political Co-operation (EPC), whilst Smith (2002) advanced a historical materialist analysis of the Amsterdam Treaty. However, the most fruitful area of study was EMU, with Marxist critiques put forward by Bonefeld and Burham (1996), Bonefeld (2001), Callinicos (2001b) and Carchedi (1997, 2001a, 2001b).

Van der Pijl (1984, 1989a, 1989b, 1998), Overbeek (1990), Holman (1992, 1996, 1998), van Apeldoorn (1996, 2000, 2002), Holman and van der Pijl (1996), Bieler (2000), and Bieler and Morton (2001a) applied a neo-Gramscian analysis to the transnational restructuring of social forces within the EU. Gill (1992, 1998) augmented this work with his concept of 'new constitutionalism': the inoculation of elite power from democratic influence by concentrating it at the EU level.

The European Round Table of Industrialists

Another fertile area of study within the political economy approach was the role of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). Richardson (1993), Cowles (1995), Balanyá et al. (2000) and Lucas and Hines (2000) found a significant relationship between the recommendations of several ERT reports, and the policy and treaty output of the EU. Apeldoorn (2000, 2002) argued that the neo-liberal ERT played a key role in transnational class formation at the EU level.

2.5 NEW PERSPECTIVES

Tentative steps were taken towards developing new ways of studying the British Left and European integration. A feminist perspective was pioneered by Wainwright (1987) and Crawley (1996), whilst Holterman (1995) insisted that the confederal and federal models of European integration were compatible with anarchist principles.

2.6 POSTGRADUATE THESES

Robins (1975), Wallace (1977), Grantham (1979), Grandjouan (1986), Tombs (1988), Currid (1993), Deavin (1996), Rippingdale (1996) and Clay (1997) focused on Labour's European policy. Volkmer (1980), Purvis (1981), Featherstone (1982) and Hamilton (1985) compared Labour's European policy with the policies adopted by other European left parties. Farthing (1984), Teague (1984), Rosamond (1993) and Abbott (1994) investigated the response of trade unions to the EU. Mills (1995) and Campbell (1997) considered the role of the labour movement in EU policy-making, whilst Zevgolis (1999) researched the interplay between socialism and nationalism in the context of European integration.

CONCLUSION

The existing research on the British Left and European integration suffers from a number of specific deficiencies. The institutional literature is composed of two main groups of studies: the first group focused on the European policies of particular sections of the British Left, whilst the second group focused on the influence of EU, Soviet and US policies.

The first group failed to analyse the European policies of the wide range of economic and political actors that constitute the British Left across the post-war period. By limiting its analysis to a relatively small range of institutions during specific periods of time, the scope for identifying the key patterns and the recurring themes was reduced.

The first group was predominantly concerned with policy outputs rather than the policy process. The precise nature of the relationship between the process and its outputs, including questions about how policy is formulated and who has a role in this, was neglected. Furthermore, several studies alluded to the existence of institutional pressure groups and factions, but did not assess what role these played.

With the possible exception of the literature on the TUC, the first group ignored the wealth of documentary evidence, such as annual conference reports, manifestos and other policy documents, that is available. As a result, European policies were discussed in general rather than in detailed, specific terms.

The first group failed to investigate the role of the rank and file in policy-making. Instead, it concentrated on the role of the leadership in determining European policy. To a certain extent, this is justifiable given the power exercised by the leadership of these institutions over policy-making. Nevertheless, obtaining the support of the party membership is critical for policy legitimacy.

The first group neglected to consider the role of discourse within left-wing institutions, plus the specific influence of discourse on policy. No studies, for example, examined the impact of anti- and pro-EU propaganda campaigns on policy-making. They also failed to explore the relationship between policies as outputs and the political economy of policy-making. Policy formation does not exist in a vacuum; it is necessary to identify how the interplay between agencies and structures, and economics and politics, shapes the policy process.

The specific literature on the Labour Party also failed to explore the relationship between policy outputs and whether the party was in government or opposition. Historically, the Labour Party is the only left-wing institution to have attained state power; therefore the relationship is an important one.

The second group did not explore the link, direct or otherwise, between the domestic and foreign policies of the EU, Soviet Union and the US, and the actual debates and European policies of the British Left. The literature on the influence of US foreign policy also failed to assess the impact of the Grand Area plan (discussed in Chapter 5.2) on the process of European integration.

The discursive literature did not investigate the policy process and policy outputs of the British Left as discursive phenomena. Instead, discourse on European integration was treated in an abstract and generalist manner. Consequently, the literature failed to locate the specific debate on the British Left within the wider British discourse on European integration. Furthermore, it did not question the materialist basis of this discourse, asking why, for example, different social forces attempted to shape the discourse through propaganda campaigns and what economic and political interests were at stake? In short, it neglected to explore the political economy of the discourse.

The political economy literature failed to analyse the range of institutions on the British Left. Instead, it focused exclusively on the political economy of Labour's European policy during particular time periods. It neglected to establish the specific causal relationship between political economy and the actual European policies of specific institutions. It also failed to consider the role of discourse in policy-making.

The institutional, discursive and political economy literature failed to engage with, learn from, or locate itself within, the respective wider literature (discussed in Chapter 3). Therefore, the insights provided by this wider work were ignored. Consequently, the opportunity to use such knowledge to transcend the limitations of their particular approach was missed.

In summary, there are five main gaps in the existing research. The first is the failure to study the wide range of institutions on the British Left. The second is the failure to study the post-war period as a whole. The third is the failure to incorporate a historical materialist analysis. The fourth is the failure of each of the three main approaches to incorporate the insights of the others. The fifth is the failure of these approaches to link with the wider literature. The main argument of the next chapter is that Coxian historicism has the potential to address these gaps, whilst transcending the limitations of the institutional, discursive and political economy approaches to date.